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It has been found that non-Gaussian operations can be applied to increase and distill entanglement between
Gaussian entangled states. We show the successful use of the non-Gaussian operation, in particular, photon
subtraction operation, on the continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
(CV-MDI-QKD) protocol. The proposed method can be implemented based on existing technologies. Security
analysis shows that the photon subtraction operation can remarkably increase the maximal transmission distance
of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol, which precisely make up for the shortcoming of the original CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol, and 1-photon subtraction operation has the best performance. Moreover, the proposed protocol provides
a feasible method for the experimental implementation of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] allows two distant
authenticated users, Alice and Bob, to establish secure key
in the presence of eavesdroppers. Quantum physics guaran-
tees the unconditionally secure communication through un-
secure channels. The existing QKD protocols have been
mainly divided into the two following categories: discrete-
variable (DV)QKD protocols [2-5] and continuous-variable
(CV) QKD protocols [6-11]. The theoretical security of some
representative protocols in these two categories of protocols
has been fully analyzed [12-20].
Compared with DVQKD protocols (such as BB84 proto-
col), CVQKD protocols have the following advantages: First
of all, the preparation of the light sources are relatively sim-
ple. Secondly, the detectors have low cost and high detection
efficiency. Thirdly, they can be effectively compatible with
existing optical communication systems. Last but not least,
CVQKD protocols allow one to approach the ultimate limit of
repeater-less communication, known as the PLOB bound [21].
For these reasons, CVQKD has received extensive attention
and in-depth study in the research area of quantum commu-
nication. The CVQKD protocol with Gaussian-modulated co-
herent states has been proved to be secure against collective at-
tacks, both in asymptotic case [14] and finite-size regime [15],
and its composable security has been fully proven [16-17].
Moreover, this protocol has been demonstrated both in labo-
ratory [10,22] and field tests [23]. Furthermore, the longest
secure transmission distance of CVQKD has been extended
to 150 km [24], which meets the demand of metropolitan net-
work and inter-city network.
Theoretically, QKD can be proved unconditional security
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However, in the process of practical experiment implementa-
tion, some assumptions in the security demonstration model
can not be fully satisfied, which leads to some potential secu-
rity vulnerabilities inevitably existing in the practical system
[25-29]. A natural attempt to narrow the gap between theory
and practice is to identify all security vulnerabilities hidden in
the practical system, and provide appropriate remedial mea-
sures. Based on this idea, we should fully characterize each
device as possible, and try to solve all the “side channel” [30].
However, it is difficult to fully implement this operation. In-
spired by the idea of entanglement swapping, two groups [31-
32] proposed measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
independently, where Alice and Bob are both senders and an
untrusted third party is introduced to perform Bell-State Mea-
surement (BSM) and communicate the corresponding result.
It needs to be emphasized that Ref. [31] solves the problem
of side-channel attack in full generality, while Ref. [32] is
limited to qubit systems. MDI-QKD not only can remove all
known or unknown side-channel attacks on detectors, but also
has favorable performance and can be easily implemented in
long distance experiments. Soon after MDI-QKD was put for-
ward, it was well analyzed in theory [33-39] and demonstrated
in experiments [40-42].
There are also two main approaches to implement
MDI-QKD: discrete-variable (DV) MDI-QKD [32,43] and
continuous-variable (CV) MDI-QKD [44-47]. Unfortunately,
compared with that of DV-MDI-QKD, the maximal transmis-
sion distance of CV-MDI-QKD is unsatisfactory. Moreover,
it is rather difficult to implement CV-MDI-QKD in experi-
ment as the quantum efficiency of the existing detectors can
not meet the experimental requirements at present [45]. Fac-
ing the shortcoming of the transmission distance of CV-MDI-
QKD, many investigations are being dedicated to improving
its performance. Interestingly, it has been demonstrated theo-
retically and experimentally that the non-Gaussian operations,
for instance, the photon subtraction and photon addition oper-
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2ations, can be used to increase and distill the entanglement
in Gaussian entangled states [48-51], and thus to significantly
enhance the transmission distance of the CVQKD protocols
[52-54]. Attractively, the photon subtraction operation can
be practically implemented with existing technologies. In-
spired by the aforementioned advantages, which are analyzed
in theory and subsequently demonstrated with simulations and
experiments, in this paper, we propose a method to improve
the performance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol by using non-
Gaussian operation, i.e.,the photon subtraction, which can be
implemented under current technology. By performing a suit-
able photon subtraction operation with the entangled source
located on Alice’s side, the new protocol can lengthen the se-
curity transmission distance in contrast with the original pro-
tocols. Furthermore, this idea provides a feasible scheme for
the demonstration of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol in the exper-
imental environment.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we first in-
troduce the original CV-MDI-QKD protocol, then introduce
the model of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with photon sub-
traction. In Sec. III,we derive the secret key of the CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with photon subtraction. In Sec. IV,we give the
numerical simulation and performance analysis. Conclusions
are drawn in Sec. V.
II. CV-MDI-QKD PROTOCOLWITH PHOTON
SUBTRACTION
In this section, we first review the original CV-MDI-QKD
protocol, especially the EB scheme. Then, we present the
model of CV-MDI-QKD protocol with photon subtraction
(based on EB scheme).
A. CV-MDI-QKD Protocol
The EB scheme of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol is illustrated
in part of Fig. 1. Alice generates one two-mode squeezed state
with variance VA, where mode A1 is retained by Alice and
mode A2 is sent to an untrusted third part Charlie through
the quantum channel with length LAC . Bob generates another
two-mode squeezed state with variance VB , where modeB1 is
retained by Bob and modeB2 is sent to an untrusted third part
Charlie through the quantum channel with length LBC . Char-
lie interferes two modes A′ and B′ at a beam splitter (BS)
with two output modes C and D. Then both the x quadra-
ture of mode C and p quadrature of mode D are measured by
Charlie through homodyne detection, and he announces the
measurement results {XC , PD} through public channel.
After receiving {XC , PD}, Bob modifies mode B1 to B′1
by displacement operation D(β), where β = g (XC + iPD),
and g represents the gain of the displacement operation. The
density matrix of mode B′1 is
ρB′1 = D (β) ρB1D
† (β) , (1)
where ρB1 is the density matrix of mod B1. Through these
operations, mode A1 and B′1 become entangled [55]. By em-
ploying heterdyne detection, Bob get the quadratures of mode
B′1: {XB , PB}, and Alice get the quadratures of mode A1:
{XA, PA}. Obviously, {XB , PB} and {XA, PA} are corre-
lated. Then Alice and Bob implement information reconcili-
ation and privacy amplification to obtaining a string of secret
key. In addition, the total transmission distance LAB is equal
to LAC + LBC .
B. Photon subtraction in CV-MDI-QKD
There are three ways to implement the CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol with photon subtraction: photon subtraction only located
on Alice’s side, photon subtraction only located on Bob’s side,
and photon subtraction located on both sides. In CV-MDI-
QKD protocol, we suppose that Alice is the sender and Bob
is the receiver, and Bob performs reverse reconciliation. Thus
Alice’s source is used to carry the information associated with
secret key, and Bob’s source, whose information is nearly re-
moved, is used to assist in generating secret key. So when suit-
able photon subtraction is operated on Alice’s side, the per-
formance of the protocol will be improved. Reversely, when
photon subtraction is operated on Bob’s side, the performance
has no improvement. Furthermore, the photon subtraction op-
eration has a certain probability of failure, which will decrease
the overall performance of the protocol with the photon sub-
traction operated on Bob’s side. Taken together, the optimal
scheme is the one that photon subtraction only located on Al-
ice’s side. Thus we mainly focus on the optical scheme where
a photon subtraction operation, which is non-Gaussian opera-
tion, is located on Alice’s side.
The EPR state |ψ〉A1A2 is generated by squeezing two vac-
uum states with two-mode squeezed operator S(r), producing
entangled mode A1 and A2 , where S(r) = exp[r(aA1aA2 −
a†A1a
†
A2
)/2], r is the squeezing parameter. Thus, the EPR state
|ψ〉A1A2 can be given by
|ψ〉A1A2 = S(r) |0, 0〉 =
√
1− ξ2
∞∑
n=0
ξn|n, n〉, (2)
where ξ =
√
VA−1
VA+1
, VA is the variance of the EPR state
|ψ〉A1A2 , |n, n〉 = |n〉A1 ⊗|n〉A2 , and |n〉 represents the Fock
states.
In our protocol, we suppose that the photon subtraction op-
eration is controlled by Fred, an untrusted third part which is
near Alice. This kind of setting can lower requirements for
the device perfection of the photon subtraction operation. The
photon subtraction operation is shown in Fred’s part of Fig. 1:
Fred uses a BS with transmittance TPS to split mode A2 and
the vacuum state F0 into modes A′2 and F . As |ψ〉A1A2 is a
EPR state, mode A1 and A′2 are entangled, the tripartite state
can be given by
ρA1FA′2 = UBS [|ψ〉A1A2〈ψ|A1A2 ⊗ |ψ〉F0〈ψ|F0 ]U
†
BS , (3)
where |ψ〉F0 = |0〉. Here we denote ρA1FA′2 = |γ〉 〈γ|, then
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FIG. 1: (Color online). EB scheme of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with non-Gaussian operation, i.e.,the photon subtraction. EPR: two-mode
squeezed state. Het: heterodyne detection. Hom: homodyne detection. PNRD: photon-number-resolving detector. D(β): displacement
operation.
|γ〉 = UBS |ψ〉A1A2 ⊗ |0〉. |γ〉 can be calculated as
|γ〉 =
√
1− ξ2
∞∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
ξn
√
Cmn (1− TPS)mTPSn−m
|n,m, n−m〉,
(4)
where n and m are natural number, n ≥ m, Cmn is a
combinatorial number. Mode F is measured by applying
positive operator-valued measurement (POVM)
{
Mk0,M
k
1
}
[52] with employing the photo-number-resolving detector
(PNRD), which can verify the photon number of quantum
mode. The photon number of subtraction k depends on Mk1 =
|k〉 〈k|. The photon subtraction operation is successful only
when the POVM element Mk1 clicks, and then the protocol
can be proceeded.
The photon-subtracted state ρPSA1A′2 can be calculated as
ρPSA1A′2 = P
−Mk1 trF (Mk1ρA1FA′2), (5)
where trα (β) is the partial trace of mode β with tracing out
its submode α. PM
k
1 is the normalization factor which denotes
the success probability of subtracting k photons in mode A2.
It is given by
PM
k
1 = trA1FA′2(M
k
1ρA1FA′2)
= (1− ξ2)
∞∑
n=k
Cknξ
2n(1− TPS)kTPSn−k
= (1− ξ2)
(
1−TPS
TPS
)k ∞∑
n=k
Ckn
(
ξ2TPS
)n
= (1− ξ2)ξ2k (1−TPS)k
(1−ξ2TPS)k+1 ,
(6)
where n ≥ k. According to Eq.(5)(6), the covariance matrix
of ρPSA1A′2 can be calculated by [57]
γPSA1A′2 =
 XI2 Zσz
Zσz Y I2
 , (7)
where I2 is 2× 2 identity matrix, σz = diag(1,−1), and
X = 2(1+k)1−ξ2TPS − 1,
Y =
2(1+kξ2TPS)
1−ξ2TPS − 1,
Z =
√
TPSξ(1+k)
1−ξ2TPS .
(8)
After the photon subtraction operation, the bipartite state
ρPSA1A′2
in Eq. (5) is not Gaussian anymore. However, by intro-
ducing the non-Gaussian operation, the entanglement degree
of this state is increased [52].
III. CALCULATION OF THE SECRET KEY RATE
In this section, we mainly focus on the secret key rate of our
protocol under one-mode collective Gaussian attack, where
Bob performs reverse reconciliation. Through a photon sub-
traction operation, a original Gaussian state will turn into a
non-Gaussian state. We suppose the secure key rate of CV-
MDI-QKD protocol with photon subtraction is KPS , and K
is the secure key rate of the one without photon subtraction,
whose source is Gaussian state. According to the optimality of
Gaussian attack [58], KPS is no less than K. Then the lower
bound of KPS can be estimated by using similar covariance
matrix of Gaussian state.
In Fig. 1, we assume that all Bob’s operations except the
heterdyne detection are untrusted, then the EB scheme of
CV-MDI-QKD protocol is converted into a common one-way
CVQKD protocol using heterdyne detection, which is shown
in Fig. 2. Thus the CV-MDI-QKD protocol can be regarded
as a specific case of the one-way CVQKD protocol which Eve
obtains less information. Suppose the secure key rate of the
equivalent one-way protocol is Kone, then we can figure out
that KPS ≥ Kone. Through calculating the secret key rate of
equivalent one-way protocol by using similar covariance ma-
trix of Gaussian state, we can give the lower bound of KPS .
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FIG. 2: (Color online). Equivalent one-way protocol of the CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with photon subtraction (EB scheme), where Eve is
aware of Charlie and all Bob’s operations except the heterdyne de-
tection.
For the convenience of analysis, we use the lower bound of
KPS to calculate the secure key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD
protocol with photon subtraction.
The CV-MDI-QKD protocol has two quantum channels,
which is different from the one-way protocol. There are
two ways for Eve to eavesdropping: taking entangling cloner
attacks on each quantum channel independently, which is
called one-mode attack, or taking correlated two-mode coher-
ent Gaussian attack where Eve injects quantum correlations
in both quantum channels, which is called two-mode attack.
When the two quantum channels are not associated, the two-
mode attack degenerates into the one-mode attack. Therefore,
the two-mode attack is a more general attack model. In Ref.
[36] and [46], the CV-MDI-QKD protocol against two-mode
coherent Gaussian attack is well analyzed, which is demon-
strated to be the optimal attack strategy.
In the practical system, when the two quantum channels
come from different directions, the correlation between the
ambient noise of the two quantum channels should be very
weak. Besides, there are some technical difficulties for Eve to
inject quantum correlations in both quantum channels. There-
fore, we restrict our analysis to two Markovian memoryless
Gaussian quantum channels, which do not interact with each
other. Then, the quantum channels of CV-MID-QKD protocol
can be reduced to a one-mode channel [59]. Under this con-
dition, the optimal attack strategy degenerates into the one-
mode attack, and taking entangling cloner attacks on each
quantum channel independently can be taken as the optimal
one-mode collective Gaussian attack. The following secret
key rate calculation, simulation and discussion are based on
one-mode collective Gaussian attack. In addition, we should
point out that Eves attack described here is not the optimal
one.
We assume the thermal excess noise and the transmittance
of the quantum channel between Alice (Bob) and Charlie are
εthA (ε
th
B ) and TA (TB). The transmittance can be given as
TA = 10
−lLAC
10 , TB = 10
−lLBC
10 , (9)
where l = 0.2 dB/km is both quantum channel losses. Here we
set a normalized parameter T =TAg
2
2 is which is associated
with transmittance of quantum channel, g is the gain of the
displacement operation in Bob. χline = 1−TT +ε
th is the total
channel-added noise expressed in shot noise units. εth refers
to the equivalent thermal excess noise of the equivalent one-
way protocol, which is shown in Fig. 2. εth can be calculated
by
εth = TBTA
(√
2
TBg2
√
VB − 1−
√
VB + 1
)2
+TBTA (χB − 1) + χA + 1,
(10)
where χA = 1TA − 1 + εthA , χB = 1TB − 1 + εthB , VB is
the modulation variance of the EPR state in Bob. In order to
minimize εth, we adopt g2 = 2(VB−1)TB(VB+1) , then
εth = TBTA (χB − 1) + 1 + χA
= TBTA
(
εthB − 2
)
+ εthA +
2
TA
.
(11)
Since the homodyne detectors in Charlie are not the ideal
apparatuses, the detection-added noise can be expressed in
shot noise units as χhom = [υel + (1− η)] /η, where η is
the quantum efficiency of the homodyne detector, υel is the
electronic noise of the detector. The total noise referred to the
channel input is expressed as χt = χline + 2χhom/T.
When Bob performs reverse reconciliation, the secure key
rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with photon subtraction
under one-mode collective Gaussian attack is calculated as
KPS = P
Mk1 (βIPSAB − χPSBE), (12)
where IPSAB is the Shannon mutual information between Al-
ice and Bob, χPSBE are the Holevo bounds [60] between Bob
and Eve, which put an upper limit on the information avail-
able to Eve on Bob’s key. β is the reconciliation efficiency
for reverse reconciliation, PΠ
k
is the success probability of
k-photon subtraction operation. Detailed calculation of the
secret key rate can be found in Appendix A.
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FIG. 3: (Color online). Relation of the success probability of sub-
tracting k photons and transmittances of BS in photon subtraction
operation. The variance of EPR state is VA = VB = 15.
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FIG. 4: (Color online). The secret key rates as a function of VA for
every optimal TPS in the symmetric case, where LAC = LBC and
transmission distance LAB = 6 km. N0 is the shot noise variance.
Other parameters are fixed as follows: thermal excess noise εthA =
εthB = 0.01, quantum efficiency of homodyne detector η = 0.975,
electronic noise of homodyne detector υel = 0.01 and reconciliation
efficiency β = 96%.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we show the performance of CV-MDI-QKD
protocol with photon subtraction compared with the original
CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
First of all, we give the relation of the success probability
of subtracting k photons and transmittances of BS in photon
subtraction operation with different photon number of sub-
traction, which is based on Eq.6 and shown in Fig. 3. The
success probability PM
k
1 should be careful considered as it is
of vital importance in calculating the secret key rate. Higher
success probability will lead to higher secure key rate and fur-
ther transmission distance. As illustrated in Fig. 3, for differ-
ent photon number of subtraction, there is always a specific
TPS leads to the optimal value of PM
k
1 . We observe that the
optimal success probability is reduced with increasing photon
number of subtraction. By subtracting more photons, more
noise is added to the covariance matrix [61], which leads to
the worse performance. Note that for all the CV-MDI-QKD
protocols with photon subtraction, 1-photon subtraction oper-
ation can obtain the highest success probability.
The variance VA and VB are of vital importance in CV-
MDI-QKD protocol. They determine the transmitting power
of the quantum signal and finally affects the transmission dis-
tance and the secret key rate of the whole system. In this pro-
tocol, we set VA = VB , and the following analysis only for
VA. In practice, the statistical variance of the practical pre-
pared EPR state is in error with VA. The larger the optimal ar-
eas of VA, the higher the flexibility and stability of the system.
Thus, we need to focus on the optimal value and optimal areas
of VA. The plot of Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the secret key rates
as a function of VA in symmetric case (LAC = LBC) and ex-
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FIG. 5: (Color online). The secret key rates as a function of VA for
every optimal TPS in the extreme asymmetric case, where LBC = 0
and transmission distance LAB = LAC = 30 km. Other parameters
are fixed as same as Fig. 4.
treme asymmetric case (LBC = 0), respectively. For the con-
venience in analysis, we set the transmission distance is 6 km
in symmetric case and 30 km in extreme asymmetric case. In
symmetric case, the secret key rate is at the peak value when
the modulation variance VA is about 100, namely the optimal
value of VA is about 100. In extreme asymmetric case, the
optimal value of VA is about 15. Compared with the original
CV-MDI-QKD protocol, the secret key rate of the protocols
employing photon subtraction operation decrease much more
slowly with the increase of VA, where the VA is greater than
the optimal value, and the protocol employing 1-photon sub-
traction operation has the slowest tempo of decrease. In this
way, the proposed protocols have much larger optimal areas of
VA than the original protocol, which means that the proposed
protocols can have a more flexible application , and the proto-
col employing 1-photon subtraction operation is most flexible.
Moreover, as the SNR will be improved with the increase of
variance, the proposed protocols can improve the performance
by appropriately increase variance VA, whose feasible maxi-
mum value is far bigger than the one of the original protocol.
To summarise, the introduction of photon subtraction opera-
tion can obviously improve the flexibility and stability of the
CV-MDI-QKD protocol, and the application of 1-photon sub-
traction operation works best.
The plot of Fig. 6 shows the secret key rates as a function
of the transmission distance from Alice to Bob, where TPS
takes the optimal values for each k. The numerical simulation
is given in the symmetric case where LAC = LBC . The solid
line labeled as k = 0 denotes the secret key rate of the origi-
nal CV-MDI-QKD protocol, whose performance is worse than
the CV-MDI-QKD protocols with photon subtraction in usual
transmission distance. In other words, the photon subtraction
operation can effectively enhance the secret key rate in usual
case and extend the maximum transmission distance. Among
all the CV-MDI-QKD protocols with photon subtraction,the
protocol with 1-photon subtraction operation has the best per-
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FIG. 6: (Color online). The secret key rates as a function of the
transmission distance from Alice to Bob for every optimal TPS in
the symmetric case, where LAC = LBC . The variance of EPR state
is VA = VB = 100. Other parameters are fixed as follows: thermal
excess noise εthA = ε
th
B = 0.01, quantum efficiency of homodyne
detector η = 0.975, electronic noise of homodyne detector υel =
0.01 and reconciliation efficiency β = 96%.
formance, which can obtain longest maximum transmission
distance.
Ref. [46] has found that the optimal network configuration
is the the extreme asymmetric case, where the untrusted third
part Charlie acts as a proxy server near to one of the legitimate
parties. Here we set Charlie is extreme close to Bob, where
LBC = 0. Then the effective transmission distance is equal
to LAC . The secret key rates as a function of the transmission
distance in this situation is plotted in Fig. 7. The maximum
transmission distance of original CV-MDI-QKD protocol can
be a relatively longer distance, up to 33.2 km is theory. The
protocols with photon subtraction are still have longer maxi-
mum transmission distance than the original protocol, and the
protocol with 1-photon subtraction operation has the best per-
formance, of which the maximum transmission distance has
reached 63 km in theory.
In addition, the PLOB bound has been plotted in both Fig. 6
and Fig. 7, which shows the ultimate limit of repeater-less
communication. By contrast, we can easily find that, when
the transmission distance is larger than 5.7 km in the symmet-
ric case (or 30.6 km in the extreme asymmetric case), the per-
formance of the CV-MID-QKD protocol with 1-photon sub-
traction is closer to the PLOB bound than that of the original
CV-MDI-QKD protocol. However, both of them cannot out-
performs the PLOB bound at any transmission distance,and
the gap between them and PLOB bound will become larger
and larger as the transmission distance increases. Further-
more, the MDI node may act as active repeater able to beat
the PLOB bound which refers to repeater-less point-to-point
communications.
Yet there is a case worthy of our attention: in the very short
transmission distance range, the secret key rate of the CV-
MDI-QKD protocols with photon subtraction is worse than
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FIG. 7: (Color online). The secret key rates as a function of the
transmission distance from Alice to Bob for every optimal TPS in
the extreme asymmetric case, where LBC = 0. The variance of EPR
state is VA = VB = 15. Other parameters are fixed as same as Fig. 6.
.
that of original CV-MDI-QKD protocol. This phenomenon is
caused by the low successful probability of photon subtraction
operation in low-channel-loss case.
By properly taking advantage of photon subtraction oper-
ation, the maximal transmission distance of CV-MDI-QKD
protocol have risen by 91.8 per cent in the symmetric case
and 89.7 per cent in the extreme asymmetric case. The effect
of performance improvement is considerable, especially for
the significant limitations of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol over
the transmission distance.
Until now, there is no experimental feasible CV-MDI-QKD
protocol has been proposed. The biggest difficulty is that the
quantum efficiency of existing detectors can not meet the re-
quirements of the protocol implementation [45]. Fig. 8 de-
picts the performance comparison of the CV-MID-QKD pro-
tocol with 1-photon subtraction and the original CV-MDI-
QKD protocol for different quantum efficiency of homodyne
detector in the extreme asymmetric case. Under the frame-
work of metropolitan area, where the transmission distance is
larger than 30.6 km, the performance of the CV-MID-QKD
protocol with 1-photon subtraction is always better than that
of the original CV-MDI-QKD protocol when the quantum ef-
ficiency of homodyne detector is a definite value. In other
words, the CV-MID-QKD protocol with 1-photon subtraction
requires lower detector’s quantum efficiency than the origi-
nal CV-MDI-QKD protocol in the case of achieving the same
performance. Adding 1-photon subtraction operation makes
the CV-MDI-QKD protocol more tolerant of the quantum ef-
ficiency of homodyne detector in metropolitan area.
Fig. 9 shows the secret key rates as a function of the quan-
tum efficiency of homodyne detector in the extreme asymmet-
ric case, and the transmission distance is set to 20 km. Under
this transmission distance, the secret key rate of the CV-MDI-
QKD protocols with photon subtraction are lower than that of
the original CV-MDI-QKD protocol when the quantum effi-
71-photon subtraction
the original protocol
FIG. 8: (Color online). Performance comparison of the CV-MID-
QKD protocol with 1-photon subtraction and the original CV-MDI-
QKD protocol for different quantum efficiency of homodyne detector
in the extreme asymmetric case. Parameters are fixed as follows: the
variance of EPR state is VA = VB = 15, thermal excess noise εthA =
εthB = 0.01, electronic noise of homodyne detector υel = 0.01 and
reconciliation efficiency β = 96%.
.
ciency of homodyne detector values in 0.901 to 1. The reason
is that the successful probability of photon subtraction oper-
ation in low-channel-loss case is quite low. However, when
the detector’s quantum efficiency is lower than 0.901, the se-
cret key rate of the protocol with 1-photon subtraction oper-
ation become higher than that of the original one. Moreover,
when the detector’s quantum efficiency is lower than 0.891,
the original CV-MDI-QKD protocol will have no secret key.
But for the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with 1-photon subtrac-
tion, the lower bound of the detector’s quantum efficiency
for generating secret key in 20 km transmission distance can
reach 0.826. To summarise, the photon subtraction operation
can significant reduce the requirement for the quantum effi-
ciency of homodyne detector, and 1-photon subtraction oper-
ation performs the best. As the photon subtraction operation
can be practically implemented with existing technologies, the
CV-MDI-QKD protocol can overcome the limitations of the
quantum efficiency of homodyne detector to some extent by
adding photon subtraction operation, which gives a feasible
scheme for the experimental realization of the CV-MDI-QKD
protocol.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a method to improve the per-
formance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol by applying suitable
photon-subtraction operations in Alice’s entangle source. The
proposed method can be implemented based on existing tech-
nologies. We give the secret key rates both in the symmetric
FIG. 9: (Color online). The secret key rates as a function of the
quantum efficiency of homodyne detector in the extreme asymmetric
case. The transmission distance is 20 km. Other parameters are fixed
as same as Fig. 8.
.
(LAC = LBC) and extreme asymmetric (LBC = 0) case.
The results show that the photon subtraction operation leads
to much longer transmission distance, which precisely make
up for the shortcoming of the transmission distance of the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol. Moreover, Among all the photon sub-
traction operations, 1-photon subtraction operation leads to
the best performance. Furthermore, the experimental imple-
mentation scheme of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol can draw on
the ideas of this protocol as it significant lowers the require-
ment of the quantum efficiency of homodyne detector. In fur-
ther research , it would be interesting to combine the photon
subtraction with other operations that can enhance the perfor-
mance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol, such as noiseless am-
plification, non-Gaussian state-discrimination detection, etc.
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Appendix A: Detailed calculation of the secret key rate
After the quantum channel and Charlie’s detection, the co-
variance matrix of ρPSA1B′1 has the following form
γPS
A1B′1 =
 aI2 cσz
cσz bI2
 =
 XI2 √TZσz√
TZσz T(Y + χt) I2
 , (A1)
8where X ,Y and Z are given in Eq. (8), I2 is 2 × 2 identity
matrix, σz = diag(1,−1). The secure key rate of the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol with photon subtraction under one-mode
collective Gaussian attack can be calculated with the form
KPS = P
Mk1 (βIPSAB − χPSBE). (A2)
The Shannon mutual information between Alice and Bob,
IPSAB , can be written as [62]
IPSAB = 2×
1
2
log2
VAM
VAM |BM
, (A3)
where VAM = (a+ 1)/2 , VBM = (b+ 1)/2, and
VAM |BM = VAM −
c2
4VBM
. (A4)
Then the Shannon mutual information can be obtained as
IPSAB = log2
(
a+ 1
a+ 1− c2/(b+ 1)
)
(A5)
In order to give the lower bound of secure key rate, we
adopt that Eve is aware of the mode F of the untrusted third
part Fred, then the state of Eve can be expressed as ρEF . Since
Eve can purify ρA1B′1EF , ρEF can be calculated by ρ
PS
A1B′1
.
Then, χPSBE can be obtained as [60]
χPSBE = S (ρEF )−
∫
dmBp (mB)S (ρ
mB
EF )
= S
(
ρPSA1B′1
)
− S
(
ρ
mB′1
A1
)
,
(A6)
where S is the Von Neumann entropy of the quantum state
ρ, mB represents the measurement of Bob. ρmBEF is Eve’s
state conditional on Bob’s measurement result, p(mB) is the
probability density of the measurement, the covariance ma-
trix of ρPSA1B′1 and ρ
mB′1
A1
are γPSA1B′1 and γ
mB′1
A1
, respectively.
S
(
ρPSA1B′1
)
is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 of
γPSA1B′1 which reads
S
(
ρPSA1B′1
)
= G[(λ1 − 1)/2] +G[(λ2 − 1)/2], (A7)
where
G (x) = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x, (A8)
is the Von Neumann entropy of a thermal state and
λ21,2 =
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4B2
)
, (A9)
where the notations is given as
A = a2 + b2 − 2c2 = X2 +T2(Y + χt)2 − 2TZ2,
B = ab− c2 = T (XY +Xχt − Z2) .
(A10)
S
(
ρ
mB′1
A1
)
= G[(λ3 − 1)/2] is a function of the symplectic
eigenvalues λ3 of γ
mB′1
A1
, which is given by [62]
γ
mB′1
A1
= γA1 − σTA1B′1HσA1B′1 , (A11)
where H =
(
γB′1 + I2
)−1
. Then we can calculate that
γ
mB′1
A1
= aI2 − cσz(bI2 + I2)−1cσz
= [a− c2/(b+ 1)]I2
(A12)
Thus, we can obtain the symplectic eigenvalues as
λ3 = a− c2/(b+ 1) = X −TZ2/[T(Y + χt) + 1]. (A13)
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